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Summary findings
At least 120 million of the world's  children aged 5 to 14  *  Child labor has not always been considered evil, and
worked full-time in 1995, most of them under  there is no consensus on why it began to decline. In some
hazardous, unhygienic conditions, for more than 10  (not all) countries legislative acts declared it illegal, in
hours a day. This is an old problem worldwide but  some there were rules about compulsory education, and
particularly so in Third World countries in recent  increasing prosperity generally made families less likely
decades. What has changed, with globalization, is our  to experience poverty if their  children weren't  working.
awareness of these child laborers. (The International  * Mandating compulsory education is regarded as
Labour Organisation distinguishes between "child work,"  more effective than outlawing child labor, because
which could include light household chores and could  attendance at school is easier to monitor, but some
have some learning value, and "child labor," a pejorative  experts believe economic progress is the answer to the
phrase.)  problem. The justification for many interventions is that
By bringing together the main theoretical ideas, Basu  the state is more concerned about the well-being of
hopes to encourage both more theoretical research and  children than their parents are; Basu believes such an
empirical work with a better theoretical foundation.  assumption to be wrong when child labor occurs as a
Among other things, Basu observes that:  mass phenomenon rather than as isolated abuse.
* The problem is most serious in Africa, where the  Basu argues that, in some economies, the market for
child-labor participation rate is 26.2 percent. The rate is  labor may exhibit multiple equilibria, with one
12.8 percent in Asia. But since 1950, the trend is a  equilibrium having low adult wage and a high incidence
decline in that participation rate worldwide. For most  of child labor and another equilibrium exhibiting high
Latin American countries, the decline is notable but less  adult wage and no child labor.
marked than in Asia. In large parts of Africa, including  The model is used to provide a framework for
Ethiopia, the problem has been extremely persistent, but  analyzing the role of international labor standards.
even there the trend is downward.
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1.  Introduction
According to the Bureau of Statistics of the International Labor Organization, in 1995, at
least 120 million of the world's children between the ages of 5 and 14 years did full-time, paid
work (ILO, 1996; Ashagrie, 1998). Many of them worked under hazardous and unhygienic
conditions and for more than 10 hours a day.  This is not a new problem. In different parts of the
world, at different stages of history, the laboring child has been a part of economic life. In
particular, children have worked in large numbers in factories from the time of the industrial
revolution in Europe and from the mid-nineteenth century in America.  In contemporary times, the
incidence of child labor is very high in Third World countries, and it has been that way for several
decades now.
What has increased is the awareness of and concern for children who work as laborers.
This is caused, in part, by the increasing globalization of the world, which has brought not only
more information about the condition of labor in different nations to academics and activists the
world over, but also goods produced by children in far away lands into the hands of consumers in
high-income countries. This has, in turn, brought two very different kinds of people on the same
platform -- individuals  who are genuinely concerned about the plight of children in poor countries
and those who comprise the forces of protectionism in developed countries.  The two have rallied
together to support a variety of interventions in Third-World labor markets, ranging from banning
imports into industrialized nations of products 'tainted' by child labor inputs, through setting
international labor standards to be monitored by international organizations such as the WTO or2
ILO, to labeling  products which used child labor so as to give the consumer the option to boycott
them.
Any such intervention is likely to have not just an impact on the well-being of children, but
also spillover effects on others.  It is imperative, therefore, that policy in this area be based on
carefil analysis and research, and not just emotion or impulse.
The literature on child labor is enormous but it is scattered across the social sciences and
piecemeal, lacking a common theoretical foundation. The aim of this paper is to provide an
analytical survey of this field, keeping in mind that this is an area where the primary reason for
theorizing is to, ultimately, influence policy. The main policy debates and options are summarized
in Section 3. Section 2 provides the factual background of the problem, drawing on large-scale
data sets and on the substantial literature rooted in formal and informal micro studies. Thanks to
the enormity of the problem in the last century, there is also a sizeable historical literature on the
subject.'  I draw on this, not comprehensively,  but keeping in mind contemporary concerns and
the analytical focus of this paper and report this in Section 2B.
Sections 4 through 7 are on models and theories related to child labor.  The traditional
argument for government intervention in child labor markets is based on the standard claim of
externalities. Such arguments are recapitulated in Section 4, which also summarizes the early
theoretical ideas of some classical economists. Conventional models treat the household as a
single decision-making unit (Becker, 1964); but once we recognize that there may be divergence
of interests within the household there is scope for arguing that children are victimized. There is
'See, for instance, Anderson (1971), Goldin (1979), Vincent (1981), Cunningham (1990),
Nardinelli (1990), Moehling (1995), Horrell and Humphries (1995, 1995a), Cunningham and
Viazzo (1996), and Galbi (1997).3
now a whole range of bargaining models available  for analyzing intra-household decision making,
some of which explicitly look into the question of child labor (for example, Moehling, 1995, and
Gupta, 1998).  These models are summarized  in Section 5, along with some suggestions for
extensions. If there are no externalities and no divergence of interest in the household, can there
still be a case for intervention?  Section 6 sketches a model (Basu and Van, 1998) which shows
that, for a class of situations, the answer is yes, because of the labor market's propensity to have
multiple equilibria. The model of Section 7 sketches an argument against harassment and shows
how this kind of analysis  can be used in thinking about child-labor legislation.
Child labor regulation is an important part of the current debate on international labor
standards, and Section 8 discusses some questions concerning international labor standards in
which the probleim  of child labor arises explicitly. Section 9 consists of brief concluding remarks.
2.  The Empirical Context
To place this analytical  survey in context and also to keep our focus on real-world policy
concerns, it is useful to begin by briefly recounting the world's actual experience with child labor.
This exercise is broken up into two subsections, one which describes contemporary macro
aggregates, and another which describes the historical roots of the problem.
A. Contemporary
Any estimate of child labor depends on how we define "child" and "labor" and on the
quality of statistics available. The ILO Convention No. 138 specifies 15 years as the age above4
which, in normal circumstances, a person may participate in economic activity. 2 Following this,
most studies treat a person of age less than 15 years as a "child". As a study by the US
Department of Labor notes, while ILO's Convention 13  8 "has been ratified by only about one
quarter of the ILO membership, it has nevertheless been internationally recognized and used as a
blue print for national policy and practice with respect to child labor" (United States Department
of Labor, 1993, p.5).  This observation carries even greater weight because the US itself is not a
signatory to the convention.
A child is classified as a "laborer" if the child is "economically  active" (Ashagrie, 1993).3
Governments and international organizations usually treat a person as economically  active or
"gainfully  employed" if the person does work on a regular basis for which he or she is
remunerated or which results in output destined for the market. The Indian census, for instance,
explicitly uses such a convention. We know from micro studies that if we instead include those
invisible'  workers who do unpaid work, which finds no market outlet, such as work within the
household, the estimates of child labor can shoot up.  Jayaraj and Subramanian's (1997) recent
calculations for the state of Tamilnadu, India, show that for the 5-14 age group in 1983, if they
use the restrictive definition of the kind that the ILO uses, 13% of all children were laborers.
2While  this is so under "normal circumstances", Convention No. 138 does specify some
special cases.  Thus for "light work" the age limit  is 13 years and for "hazardous work" it is 18
years (ILO, 1996). See UNICEF (1994) for a discussion of Convention No. 138 and for
alternative conceptions of what constitutes child labor (see also Knutsson, 1997).
3The ILO often distinguishes between "child work" and "child labor", the latter being used
to describe the more pejorative part of "child work", whereas "child work" in itself could
including doing light household chores and can actually have some learning value (ILO, 1995, p.
1). I shall, however, here use "work" and "labor" interchangeably,  while referring to what the
ILO calls "child labor".5
Using the more liberal  definition the figure  jumps to 33%.4
Even after the definitions are sorted out (to the extent that they can be) official data on
child labor tends to be deficient because of the likelihood of under-reporting.  In most countries
there are laws which place restrictions on child labor, ranging from an outright ban (as in most
industrialized countries) to other kinds of limitations such as an outright ban on child labor for
very small children, and for all children in hazardous industries (as, for instance, in Bangladesh,
India and Pakistan). Thus it is natural for guardians and employers to hide the information of
'illegal' work by children.
Keeping all these caveats in mind, and cobbling information from various sources,
Kebebew Ashagrie (1993) (see also Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995) was the first to put together an
international data set on child labor. He found that in 1990 there were nearly 79 million  children
who were economically  active. Most of them (57 million)  were in Asia. However, over the
previous 10 years, he found that the absolute number of children working was declining in Asia
but rising in the Americas and Africa, sharply in the latter.  This data is summarized in Table 1.
It is worth pointing out that while Ashagrie's (1993) estimates, as summarised in Table 1,
have the virtue of comprehensiveness, they generally give lower values for the incidence of child
labor than other existing estimates. Indeed, more recent work by Ashagrie (1998) and the ILO
(1996), which were based on detailed experimental surveys in Ghana, India, Indonesia and
4This point is reinforced at the all-India level by Weiner (1996, p. 3007) who argues that
"most of the 90 million children not in school are working children". See also Labenne (1995) for
alternative defirnitions  of child labor and how different variables affect them in India. Some
economists adopt the convention of distinguishing between "work"  and "home care", classifying
children who do not attend school and are not formally employed as "home care laborers"
(Cartwright and Patrinos, 1998).6
Senegal, have resulted in upward revisions of these figures. In addition, it must be kept in mind
that all figures quoted in this section relate to full-time work. Recent ILO estimates suggest that if
"child labor" is taken to include those who do part-time work, the numbers more than double.
Thus the 1995 figure, quoted at the start of this essay, for child labor would rise to 250 million.
Table 1. Child Labor: Aggregate and Distribution
Number of Children (below 15 years) Working (in thousands)
1980  1985  1990
World  87,867  80,611  78,516
Africa  14,950  14,536  16,763
Americas  4,122  4,536  4,723
Asia  68,324  61,210  56,784
East Asia  39,725  33,463  22,448
Southeast Asia.  6,518  6,079  5,587
South Asia  20,192  19.834  27,639
Source: Ashagrie (1993)
The Asian figures are very large; but it has to be kept in mind that Asia's population is
very large.  So to get a better idea of the magnitude of the problem, we may wish to look at the
'participation rate',  that is, the percentage of children of the relevant age group who work as
laborers. In terms of participation rates, for the 10 - 14 years category, the problem in 1990 was
most serious in Africa, with a figure of 27.87%.  The participation rate for Asia was 15.19%.7
These statistics are available  from the ILO (1  996a), which has now compiled inter-country  data
on child labor from 1950  to  1995, along with projections, up to 2010. A summary  of this
information  is provided in Table 2 and Graph 1. The first five rows show the distribution of child
labor across the main  continental regions of the world. In addition, a sample  of five nations,  from
among those which had a participation  rate of over 20% in 1950, are represented in the table to
give the reader a glimpse  of how varied the experience of different nations has been.
Table 2.  Participation Rates for Children, 10 - 14 Years
1950  1960  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2010
World  27.57  24.81  22.30  19.91  14.65  13.02  11.32  8.44
Africa  38.42  35.88  33.05  30.97  27.87  26.23  24.92  22.52
Latin America  & Caribbean  19.36  16.53  14.60  12.64  11.23  9.77  8.21  5.47
Asia  36.06  32.26  28.35  23.42  15.19  12.77  10.18  5.60
Europe  6.49  3.52  1.62  0.42  0.10  0.06  0.04  0.02
Ethiopia  52.95  50.75  48.51  46.32  43.47  42.30  41.10  38.79
Brazil  23.53  22.19  20.33  19.02  17.78  16.09  14.39  10.94
China  47.85  43.17  39.03  30.48  15.24  11.55  7.86  0.00
India  35.43  30.07  25.46  21.44  16.68  14.37  12.07  7.46
Italy  29.11  10.91  4.12  1.55  0.43  0.38  0.33  0.27
Source: ILO  (1996a)Graph 1.  Trends in the Participation Rates
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As this graph and table show, the problem is enormous but the trend, fortunately, is in the
right direction.  For some countries, such as China, India, and especially Italy. the decline in the
participation rate of children has been quite rapid.  For most Latin American nations, such as
Brazil, the decline is notable but less marked. The problem has been extremely persistent in large
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, as illustrated by Ethiopia, but even here the trend is downwards.  For
China, interestingly, the decline is most rapid between 1980 and 1990, which happens to coincide
with the period of very rapid growth in incomes.i
The overall growth of an economy is by no means the only factor, nor for that matter the
most important factor, in the mitigation of child labor.  Changes in technology, improvement in
the conditions of thie  adult labor market, and the availability  of decent schooling can all lead to
children being voluntarily withdrawn from the labor force.  Levy (1985), in a study of rural Egypt,
found that mechanization did contribute to a diminution in child labor and also fertility. The
cultivation of cotton, specially  weeding and picking, has conventionally been child-labor intensive
in Egypt.  So changes in cropping pattern, away from cotton, played a role in curbing child labor.
We shall return to the subject of ho's'  to curb child labor later. Let us, before that, take a
look at the historical backdrop of the contemporary situation, just described.
One has to be careful not to read too much into these macro statistics. Most of the data
are constructed by extrapolating from a few small-scale  detailed studies. Even in the US, where a
considerable amount of money and effort goes into collecting labor data, the amount of child
labor is prone to be under-reported (Kruse and Mahoney, 1998). The problem must be that much
more acute for developing countries, especially ones where state control makes it difficult  for
independent researchers to collect and verify data.10
B. Historical
Here is an excerpt from an interview of a child laborer.
Q.  "What were your hours of labor, do you recollect, in that mill?"
A.  "In the summer season we were very scarce of water."
Q.  "But when you had sufficient water, how long did you work?"
A.  "We began at 4 o'clock in the morning and worked till 10 or I I at night; as long as
we could stand upon our feet."
Q.  "You hardly could keep up for that length of time'?"
A.  "No, we often fell asleep."
This could have been a contemporary interview, but it is not. it took place on 23 June
1832. The interview was conducted by a British Parliamentary committee, investigating the
conditions of child labor in the United Kingdom.  In this case the interviewee was Peter Smart,
who had worked as a laborer from the age of 5 years.  Peter Smart was not an exceptioll. The
Select Committee Report of 183  1-32 from which I have taken the above interrogatioln  (see p.
338, British Parliamentary Papers, 1968), is an enormous document, reporting on a series of
interviews of both child laborers and factory-owners and managers. The stoiy that emerges has
little variation. The children worked long hours, were frequently beaten and were paid a pittance.
British census data reveal that the incidence of child labor was very high in the early and
middle nineteenth century. According to the Census of England and Wales in 186  1,  6.' Oo  ot
boys in the 10-14 age-group were laborers and the statistic for girls was 20.59%.`!  A comlpal-ison
with Table 2 shows that though the incidence of child labor was higher tor Ati;ica  anid  Asia in
1950, currently no continental region in the world has higher participation rates thani  tritaini did in
the middle of the last century. However, some na/itionis,  such as Ethiopia, have a ImLuCh hiIhelr  rate
'Going by the census, child labor in England and Wales peaked in 1861 for boys, and in
1871  for girls.  The participation rates dropped off rapidly after 1871 (see Cunningham, 1996).11
(see Table 2).  W'hile  the participation of children in the labor force may have been particularly
high in Britain, the experience of other industrializing  nations, such as Belgium, the U.S. and
Japan were not very different (De Herdt, 1996; Parsons and Goldin, 1989, and Saito, 1996).7
While, historically, attention was drawn to the child labor problem during the industrial
revolution, there are scholars who have argued that the problem was not especially acute during
this time.  According to them, child labor was comparably widespread even in the early eighteenth
century, though the children did not work in factories at that time. But most of such obselvations
are based on impiressions  rather than statistics.  Moreover, the experience of working in farms,
alongside ones parents, is arguably less grim than working in factories for 14 hours at a stretch
(Cunningham, 1990), as suggested by the interview quoted above.
This view finds reinforcement in a contemporary study conducted by researchers at the
Delhi School of Economics' and the Indian Social Institute which shows that child labor in rurllil
areas  is often 'light', so much so that these children ought to be able to get education without
seriously cutting into their work commitments, if they had access to proper schools (Bhatty et al,
1997). This study, based on interviewing 1, 221 rural Indian parents, found that among the out-
of-school childrern,  about half worked less than 3 hours on the day preceding the survey and only
18% worked more than eight hours.  The story is very different for fitco'rl  workers and organized
child labor, as, for instance, in the match-industry of Sivakasi (Kothari, 1983E  Kulkarni, 1983).
The large incidence of child labor in the industrialized nations in the last century, gave rise
7For a general discussion of inter-country experience in the last century see Weiner (1991)
and Cunningham and Viazzo (1996).
'I am grateful to Jean Dreze, who was part of this team, for a very valuable discussion on
this.12
to a lot of debate and ideas from which we can benefit today. 9 What is quite striking and
noteworthy is that child labor has not always been thought of as an evil.  There have been times
when it was treated as unpleasant to the child, but nevertheless desirable, somewhat akin to our
contemporary view of education. Thus we find an eighteenth-century writer observing that
"parents, whose childhood was spent in idleness, have contracted every absurd prejudice against
the employment of children, as unnatural, cruel and unprofitable"." 0 B. L. Hutchins and A.
Harrison (1903) have recounted many instances of this attitude. They quote, for instance, a 1770
document, which argues that "being constantly employed at least twelve hours in a day ... we
hope the rising generation will be so habituated to constant employment, that it would at length
prove agreeable and entertaining to them ... [From] children thus trained up to constant labor we
may venture to hope the lowering of its price" (Hutchins and Harrison, 1903, p.5)"
Nevertheless, as the excesses of child labor increased through the early nineteenth century,
opposition also mounted.  And by the late nineteenth century child labor was on the decline. It is
true that this institution would soon be 'exported' out of the industrialized nations, as the practice
of child labor got shifted to the colonies, but within the boundaries of industrialized nations, it was
undeniably on the way out.
9For a lucid summary account, see Cunningham  and Viazzo (I 996a).
" 0Quoted in Cunningham (1990, p. 120).
"By the time the child labor debate picked up steam in the United States in the late
nineteenth century, child labor was viewed as it is done today, as an unmitigated evil. The reasons
given against the institution of child labor are also rather like the ones given today, the important
exception being the argument of "race degeneracy". Child labor, it was reasoned, should be ended
in the South because that would help "the preservation of its Anglo-Saxon stock" (Kelway, 1906,
p.261). Similar sentiment was expressed repeatedly, by several authors, in the March 1906 issue
of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.13
How did this happen? There is no consensus  on this. On the one hand there were a series
of legislative  acts limiting  child  labor and ultimately  declaring  it unconditionally  illegal,  and there
were also rules about compulsory  education  which  made it difficult  for children  to work full time.
On the other  hand,  the increasing  prosperity  of Europe,  the USA  and Japan  made it easier  for
parents  to pull children  out of work without  having  to fear  that this would  commit  the household
to poverty.
All  these fIactors  must have played  a role with important  regional  and sectoral  differences.
Scholliers'  (1995,  p. 208) study of child  labor  in Ghent,  Belgium,  revealed  that, by the mid-
nineteenth  century  "the number  of children  under  twelve  had diminished  substantially,  and this
without any  legislative  intervention".  By contrast,  the law played  an important  role in the decline'
of child  labor  in the cotton mills  of Manchester  (Bolin-Hort,  1989).  Brown,  Christiansen  and
Philips  (1992)  in their study of the fruit and vegetable  canning  industry  in the U.S.,  between 1880
and 1920,  found  that the decline  in the incidence  of child  labor  was due to both natural economic
reasons and  legal factors,  though the economic  forces were the stronger  explanatory  variable.
There  is, however,  some  agreement  on one matter. If one is using  legislative  fiat to fight
child  labor, it is more  effective  to legislate  for compulsory  education  instead  of simply  banning
child  labor  (Weiner,  1991). One  good reason  for this is that a child's  presence  in school  is easier
to monitor  (and thus ensure)  than  a child's  absence  from  work.
There were others  who in the context of the historical  debate  felt that legislation,  whether
it be for compulsory  education  or a direct  ban on child  labor, cannot  be as effective  as economic
progress;  and thai the right policy  is to wait for economic  progress. Such a position  is associated
with Nardinelli  (N[ardinelli,  1990;  and, for discussion,  see Cunningham  and Viazzo, 1996).14
One of the more systematic  investigations  of the historical  role of law  in the decline  of
child  labor  occurs in the work of Carolyn  Moehling  (1998).  Her focus of study  is the United
States  from 1880  to 1910. This  is part of the period during  which  the incidence  of child  labor
dropped  off rapidly.  It was also a period of activism  against  child  labor. In 1900  twelve  states had
a minimum  age limit  of 14 years  for manufacturing  employment.  By 1910  thirty-two  states had
such a restriction.  The question  that she investigates  is whether  it was the legislation  that caused
the decline  in child  labor or whether  it was the diminishing  dependence  of industry  on child  labor
that made  the judicial  activism  possible.
The method  that she uses  is the "difference  of difference  of difference"  (DDD).  A more
standard  method  (for instance,  one used by Angrist  and Krueger, 1991,  and Margo  and Finegan;
1996)  would  have  required  her to compare  the difference  in the difference  in the occupation  rates
of children  aged 13 years  and 14 years  in states  which  have  a law debarring  below 14 year  olds
from working  in manufactures  and states which  have no such  law to see if the law  had an impact.
What Moehling  does is to add another  layer  of differencing  by looking  at the difference-in-
difference  before and after some  states adopted  such legislation.  This presumably  nets out the
effect  that there may  be differences  between  different  states, stemming  not from  law but more
inherent  traits, such  as industrial  structure.  Using  national  random  samples  of households  from the
censuses  of 1880, 1900  and 1910  and  the method  of DDD,  Moehling  concludes  that minimum
age restrictions  had little  impact  on the employment  in the US at the turn of the century.
The finding  is important  but not conclusive.  For one, once one begins  to go the route of
adding  on differences,  strictly  speaking,  there is no stopping.  Just as there may  be innate
differences  between  states, there may  be innate  differences  (in particular,  ones which  are not the15
product  of law) in changes  over time across  states.
Turning  1.o the subject  of state intervention,  one must,  in assessing  the efficacy  of a law,
distinguish  between  the case  where  the law is not properly  implemented  and one in which  the law
is implemented  but its net effect  on society  is not desirable.  What Moehling's  study points  to is
the inadequate  implementation  of the US law. This does not mean  that the law is not the right
method of intervention  for eradicating  child  labor.  Another  country  at another  time of history  may
be able  to implement  a law which  had, allegedly,  failed  elsewhere  in the late nineteenth  century.
An important  pollicy  question  facing  us is whether  a legislative  intervention  is a desirable  one?
Does it promote  welfare  when properly  implemented?  To answer such  questions  it is essential  to
have a theoretical  model  for analyzing  child  labor.  Later, when we have  studied  such  models,  we
will see that there is scope  for using  both legislative  and non-legislative  interventions.  Policy
towards child  labor  has to be more nuanced  and context specific  than what governments  and
international  organizations  have  attempted.  But before  we get to such  a conclusion  it is useful  to
recapitulate  what the major  policy  options are, and the role of different  institutions.
3. The Policy  Questions
In the battle  against  child  labor  a variety  of laws  and interventions  have  been  tried and
even  more discussed.  In recounting  this debate,  it is useful  to distinguish  between  three kinds of
interventions  and institutions:  intra-national,  supra-national  and extra-national.
Intra-national effort consists  of the laws  that a country  enacts  and interventions  that it
plans  in order to control  child  labor  within  the national  boundary.  This invariably  comes  with a
certain  amount  of institutional  paraphernalia,  such as organizations  set up to administer  the law16
and otherwise dissuade child employment. Contrary to the popular view, the qucstion is not just
between banning and not banning child labor. Instead a range of different instruments have been
tried. This varies from one of the earliest pieces of legislation, such as the child labor law enacted
by the state of Massachusetts, USA, in 1837, which prohibited firms from employing children
under the age of 15 years, who had not attended school for at least three months in the previous
year, to contemporary laws such as Nepal's The Labor Act, 1992, and The Children's Act, 1992
that place restrictions on indigenous child labor 12. Many countries also have important non-
governmental, intra-national efforts to curb child labor. The Daughters' Education Programme
(DEP) in northern Thailand is one such effort.  DEP tries to prevent little girls from going into
prostitution by providing education and mobilizing  local opinion. Literacy programs and
compulsory education, to the extent that these get in the way of labor, may also be viewed as an
intra-national intervention. I return to the subject of education below.
Supra-national interventions are those attempted through international organizations, such
as the ILO, the WTO, and the UNICEF, which by  establishing conventions, and encouraging and
cajoling nations to ratify them, have tried to curb child labor. The most powerful, and also
controversial, instrument that the supra-national institutions can use to curb child labor is the
imposition of 'international labor standards', that is, a set of rninimal  rules and conditions for labor
which all countries are expected to satisfy.  Since the adoption of such standards makes it possible
to take punitive action (such as imposing  trade sanctions) against defaulting nations, these can be
potentially quite effective. Labor standards are discussed in Section 8.
" 2The Children's Act, 1992, prohibit children of age 13 years or less from doing any work
as employed laborers.  The Labor Act, 1992, place restrictions of the kind of labor that children
can do in 'enterprises' that employ ten or more persons (ILO, 1995).17
Thanks to controversy and a divergence of opinion the world has been slow to adopt
international labor standards.  This has led some developed countries to consider legislation and
other action in their own countries which could curb child labor in developing nations.  Such
actions are what I label as extra-national.  Consider, for instance, the Child Labor Deterrence
Act,  or the so-called "Harkin's bill", which has been debated extensively in the US Congress. In a
nutshell this is a law that seeks to disallow  the import into the US of goods that have been
produced with the help of child labor. The law will work within the US but is nevertheless
expected to have a strong deterrent effect in developing countries. There are variants of the
Harkin's bill which have been considered and debated in the US. The "Sanders' amendment",
which seeks to amend the Tariff Act of 1930 so as to deter the import of goods produced by
unfree or bonded child labor, is another (and, to me, a more reasonable) example of extra-national
intervention, as are recent efforts to have imported goods which are "child labor free" to be
labeled as such.
The trouble with such extra-national interventions is that these can come to be misused by
lobbies and protectionists representing narrow, sectarian interests. It is possible to take different
views about the original motivation behind a bill. Alan Krueger (1997), for instance, did an
unusual test of the hypothesis that it is protectionism that prompted the Harkin's bill (see also
Dani Rodrik, 1997). His study was based on checking what kinds of constituency the sponsors of
the bill come from; and he concluded that the motivation for the bill was humanitarian concern.
On the other harnd,  while the recent versions of the Harkin's bill have no mention of trade and
protection, giving the impression of its only concern being the humanitarian one regarding the
plight of children, an early version of the bill had openly appealed that adult workers in the United18
States and other developed countries should not have their jobs imperiled by imports produced by
child labor in developing countries (United States Department of Labor, 1992, p. 5; see also Basu,
1994; and Harkin, 1994)'3. Fortunately, the original motivation is not the relevant question. What
one has to be aware of is that such laws can be misused by the forces of protection.
An intra-national intervention which deserves to be discussed separately, is education and
compulsory schooling. Historically this has been considered a major instrument for eradicating
child labor. The relation between education and child labor has been an area of active empirical
investigation. 14 The important finding is that not only are these not mutually exclusive activities
but there may be important complementarities  between them. Thus, while Psacharopoulos' (1997)
study, using household survey data from Bolivia and Venezuela, shows that though working
children contribute substantially  to household incomes, the educational attainment of children who
work is significantly  lower than that of non-working children, Patrinos and Psacharopoulos'
(1997) research using Peruvian data reveals that child labor is not detrimental to schooling and
leave the authors wondering if in some cases "working actually makes it possible for the children
to go to school" (p.398). Presumably they are referrring here to part-time work which leaves
children the time to go to school. Hence, a restricted amount of child labor and schooling can
actually be complementary. This is especially true in rural areas and the urban informal sector
where work hours are not rigid. In his study of child labor in rural Bengal, Maharatna (1997)
13Subsequently,  the text of the bill (version of April 17, 1997) has changed further and this
time in the right direction. It now tends to isolate child labor performed "under circumstances
tantamount to involuntary servitude" or "under exposure to toxic substances or working
conditions otherwise posing serious health hazards" as the kind against which the import
restriction in the US will principally apply.
14For  instance,  Jensen and Nielsen (1997), Grootaert (1998) and Psacharopoulos (1997).19
found that male (female) children, aged 10-15, worked on average 7.78 hours (4.59 hours) a day,
and of that only 3.01 hours (0.01 hours) were spent on formal wage employment. The importance
and possibility of work-and-school among the very poor is also brought out well in Grootaert's
impressive empirical study of child labor in Cote d'Ivoire. This does not detract from the fact that
compulsory education can play a role in limiting child labor (Weiner, 1991). Morever, even if the
education is not compulsory, the mere availability  of good schools can do a lot in diverting
children away from long hours in the work place (Dreze and Gazdar, 1996; Addison et al,  1997).
In debating policy questions, in particular the choice between compulsive measures, such
as legal bans and compulsory education, it has to be kept in mind that for a child to work is not
the worst thing that can happen. So when we stop child labor, there must be reason to believe that
this will not make children worse off, for instance, by causing starvation or bodily harm" 5.
Even if legal intervention in the child labor market is found to be undesirable, this does
not mean government should sit back and wait for natural economic growth to gradually remove
children from the labor force. Government can intervene in the market to create a variety of
incentives, such as providing better and more schools, giving school meals and improving
conditions in the adult labor market, which result in a reduction of child labor.
The justification for a lot of these interventions depends on whether we believe that the
state is more concerned about the well-being of children than are the parents of the children. I
believe that such a presumption would be wrong when child labor occurs as a mass phenomenon
as distinct from cases of isolated abuse.  This is not to deny that there are contexts where legal
" 5A similar point has been made by Sarah Bachman (1995, p.3), who observed that
attempts to bar children from working in the manufacturing sector in Bangladesh have pushed
some of them over to prostitution.20
bans, total or sectoral, are desirable. But one needs careful, theoretical analysis to identify the
contexts where these are likely to be beneficial.
4.  Early Theoretical Ideas
Given the widespread prevalence of child labor in the last century it is not surprising that
the origins of our contemporary mathematical models and theoretical constructs can be found,
albeit in a much more primitive form, in the contributions of earlier writers such as Karl Marx,
Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou.
Marx, writing at a time when the incidence of child labor in factories was at a peak, had a
lot to say on the subject.  Focusing here on the theoretical ideas it is interesting to note how Marx
in Capital (Volume 1, Chapter 15, Section 3) virtually outlined a formal model of the cause of
child labor. He first noted how, with the rise of new technology, in particular machinery, there
arose scope for employing those "whose bodily development is incomplete, but whose limbs are
all the more supple.  The labor of women and children was, therefore, the first thing sought by
capitalists who used machinery" (Marx, 1867, p. 372).
The availability  of machinery can, in an ideal world, create more time for leisure. But
Marx noted that since the machinery was owned by one agent and labor by another, a diminished
need for labor would tend to depress wages  6. So much so that (1) it may be worthwhile for the
capitalist to use labor liberally  and (2) it may be necessary for workers to have their entire family
work in order to make ends meet.  Marx (1867, p. 373) writes: "[Machinery]  thus depreciates [the
16 Empirical investigations cast doubt whether average wages did fall during this period.
However, in certain sectors, such as the handloom, this was certainly the case (Lyons, 1989).21
man's] labor power....  In order that the family may live four people must now, not only labor, but
expend surplus-labor for the capitalist". This argument is very close to ideas that we pursue later;
and can give rise to the possibility of multiple equilibria, as shown in Section 6A.
Marx also noted the long-term debilitating consequences of child labor." 7 But it was
Marshall who puisued this idea, to the point of sketching a dynamic argument.  Marshall (1920, p.
620), with his characteristic fastidiousness, observed that children had labored even before the
industrial revolution "but the moral and physical misery and disease caused by excessive work
under bad conditions reached their highest point in the first quarter of the [nineteenth] century".
He noted (p. 469) that "the most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings".
Most interestingly, he showed awareness of the dynamics of these observations: "The less
fully [the children's] faculties are developed, the less will they realize the importance of the
faculties of their children, and the less will be their power of doing so. And conversely any
change that awards to the workers of one generation better earnings, together with better
opportunities of developing their best qualities, will increase the material and moral advantages
which they have the power to offer to their children" (Marshall, 1920, p. 468).
Some of the features of this quote will be captured in a formal model in Section 6D.
On policy, most early writers ranged from favoring a ban on child labor to placing severe
restrictions on the quantity and quality of child labor. Pigou (1962), who favored a ban, was
aware that a ban could cause poor families  to dip below their subsistence level and so argued that
a ban should be coupled with social welfare being provided by the state to the neediest families.
"On a matter of policy Marx was against a total ban on child labor for the Europe of his
time.  He favored restrictions on working hours and compulsory education (Marx, 1875).22
He did not tell us what his prescription would be if such social welfare was not forthcoming.
On what theoretical grounds did these early writers support government intervention in
this matter?  As we shall see later, more formally, there is a host of possible arguments; but for a
long time the most popular has been that of 'externalities'. Keeping a child away from education
may mean rnissing out on benefits for society at large which do not accrue to the parent who takes
the decision. For one, the main benefit goes to the child. As Marshall (1920, p. 470) noted:
"Whoever may incur the expense of investing capital in developing the abilities of the workman,
those abilities  will be the property of the workman himself: and thus the virtue of those who have
aided him must remain for the greater part  its own reward".  John Stuart Mill also stressed the
positive externality of education, arguing that for a parent not to educate the child is a breach of
duty not only towards the child but "towards the members of the community generally,  who are
all liable  to suffer seriously from the consequences of ignorance and want of education in their
fellow citizens" (Mill, 1970, p. 319).  By extension, he concluded (p. 323): "Children,  and young
persons not yet arrived at maturity, should be protected ... from being over-worked.  Laboring for
too many hours in the day, or on work beyond their strength, should not be permitted".
Externalities are such a well-known argument for intervention that it is often used too
cavalierly  by economists and non-economists. It is frequently used as a facade when the real
reasons are more self-serving. In the context of child labor the externality argument needs to be
made carefully for it to command attention.  An excellent statement of this occurs in the recent
work of Grootaert and Kanbur (1995).  Grootaert and Kanbur consider the possibility  that the
social returns to education may exceed private returns.  So government intervention to direct
children away from work and to the classroom may be desirable. The ideal policy for achieving23
this, according to them, is to bolster the returns to education. They consider a ban on child labor
to be a second-besi.  intervention.
An extreme case of externality arises in the model of Gupta (1998) in which there is a total
bifurcation between agency and welfare, since parents and employers take the child employment
decision entirely in their self-interest. The child is simply an instrument of their bargain. The model
in part B of the next section  may therefore be viewed as a model of extreme externality.
5.  Bargaining Models
The forma:l  analysis of child labor is closely related to the modeling of household behavior.
The early ventures in this direction (for instance, Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977; Goldin, 1979)
were models of household decision-making, which tried to simultaneously  explain decisions of
consumption and child labor and, at times, also child schooling and fertility. The specifications
were kept simple enough to allow for this greater generality and also to allow for empirical
testing. Subsequent work moved away from this to allow for the possibility  that an household's
behavior is not determined by one benevolent dictator, but instead is the outcome of internal
bargains and power struggle. Models involving bargaining can and have been used to explain
child labor and the level of well-being of children, though by and large such efforts treat child
labor not as the facus of analysis but a fall-out of general household modeling. In this section, I
present the main outline of these models, focusing on and drawing out their implications for child
labor.
Bargaining models of child labor may be classified into two distinct kinds, depending on
who the agents involved in the bargain are.  According to one view, the bargain occurs within the24
family, between the parent and the child. The other approach treats the employer and the parent s
of the child as the agents involved in bargaining.'8 These two models are the subject matter of the
next two subsections, respectively.
A.  Intra-household Bargaining
The traditional model of the household, known as the tinitary  model, characterizes the
household as a single unit of decision making (Becker, 1964). This is a valid model if one person
in the household happens to be a dictator or all persons have the same utility fiunction.
There is however increasing evidence that a household's consumption pattern tends to
change as the composition of who earns how much changes even when the total earnings of the
household is unchanged (see, for example, Thomas, 1990; Strauss and Thomas, 1995; and
Moehling, 1995). This is usually taken to indicate that the household is not a single conflict-free
unit of decision making but, instead, an area of bargaining, where a person's bargaining power
depends on the resources one brings to the household and one's fall-back options.19
A general representation of these approaches occurs in what is known as the collective
model (Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994). Moehling (1995) has adapted this model further by
taking explicit account of the child. For a simple version of this model, we could think of the
household as being characterized by one parent (agent 1) and one child (agent 2).  Since I am here
" 8These studies, therefore, exclude the case of "street children" who live on their own and
belong to no household as such. The present paper also does not address the problem of homeless
children. This is, however, not a negligible category (see Myers, 1988).
" 9See, for instance, Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Homey, 1981; Folbre, 1986;
Sen, 1990; Browning et al, 1994; Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995; Udry, 1996; and Agarwal, 1997.25
not interested  in the demand  functions  for different  products,  I shall  assume  that there is only one
good in the economy  and  Y.  is the amount  consumed  by agent  i. Let the unit of the good be
chosen  such  that its price happens  to be 1. As in Moehling's  model,  suppose  each  agent in the
household  is concerned  about  the consumption  of all members  of the household. 20 Let ui be
person  i's utility  function.
The household's  utility  function  is a weighted  average  of u, and u 2 where  the weight
attached  to the parent's  utility,  a, depends  on the incomes  of the parent  and the child,  denoted,
respectively  by y, and Y 2. In other words,  in a household's  utility  function  who  gets how much
weight  depends  on who  brings  how much  money 2 1. Hence,  in the collective  model,  the
household's  decision-problem  is as follows.
Max  a(yl,y2)u,(x,,x2)  + [I  - a(y1,y2)]u 2(x,,x2).
NX,X2}
subject  to xl + x 2 < Y, + Y 2.
It is assumed  that
-Ž0>  <,  < 0,  ->0  - 0,
ay,  aY2  adx  dx2
au2  au2
>  O,  >  O  and  0  <  a  <.
axi  ax2
201t is worth stressing  that the important  special  case  of this model  is where  each person  is
concerned  about his own  welfare  and the final  household  consumption  and labor  supply  is entirely
a consequence  of the power  of different  individuals.
21In  this model  the household  allocation  is always  Pareto efficient.  The empirical  validity  of
this is not uncontested  (see Udry, 1996).26
Moehling estimates a closely-related model using household data from early twentieth
century urban America and finds that working children receive a larger share of household
resources than non-working children.
This model can be taken further to explain a child's participation in the work force. To see
this note that, strictly speaking, members of a household consume not just goods and services but
also leisure. For simplicity assume that the adult always works.  Let e be the work done by the
child, where e E [0, 1]. The child's consumption of leisure is, therefore, I - e.
Given that each person's utility depends on xl, x2 and e, a natural extension of the above
model is to think of the household as facing the following decision problem, which I shall call the
"collective  maximization problem":
Max a(y,,y2)u,(xl,x2,e)  + [1  -a(y,,y 2)]u 2(x,,x.2,e)
xl .x2'e
subject to  xi +  x1 < y,  + Y2-
This is however a more complicated problem than appears at first sight since the child's
income, Y 2, depends on the choice of e.  Thus it is not clear that Y 2 can be thought of as an
exogenous variable.
There are two alternative routes that one can take from here. One way out of this is to
treat a as a function of the price vector, as in Bourguignon and Chiappori ( 1994). Then, since the
wage rate is a price, a will turn out to be a function of the wage rates of adults and children (w,
and w2) rather than y 1 and Y 2. And of course the budget constraint will now be:
XI  +  X2 < WI + eW2,
keeping in mind that the adult always works full-time.27
This gives  us a straight-forward  optimization  problem,  which  avoids  the complication  of
simultaneity.  The empirical  plausibility  of this approach  however  seems  open  to question.  It
implies  that a person's bargaining  power  in the household  depends  not on the person's actual
share  of the household  income  but on the wage  that one could earn,  if one worked  full  time.
Sociological  studies,  on the other hand,  suggest  that a woman's  bargaining  power in the
household  is diminished  if a woman  does not do outside  work (Riley,  1997).
A second  way  out of this difficulty  is one  which  rectifies  this weakness  and assumes  that a
person's power  depends  on how much  income  the person  actually  brings  to the household  budget.
This is, however,  technically  more complicated.  Note that in the collective  maximization  problem
the decision  maker  is, effectively,  an amalgam  of the members  of the household  with  the
preference  of each member  receiving  some  weight.  Once  the child's  effort  (or, for that matter
anybody's  effort) is thrown  in as one of the variables  over which  a decision  has to be reached,  the
weights  that individuals  receive  (here  captured by a and 1-a) depend  on what decision  gets
taken. In other words,  who the decision  maker  is, depends  in part on what the decision  is.
Hence,  the collective  decision  problem  cannot  be thought  of as a normal-form  game,  since  in such
a game  the players  or the decision  makers  are primitives.  One  direction  that one can pursue  is to
take Y2 as exogenous  and  have  the household  decide  on x,, x2 and e; and then  check whether  we
recover  the same  Y2. If we do, then we have  a 'household  equilibrium'.
In order  to do this let us take a child's  wage  rate to be w. That is, a full  unit of work by a
child  yields  a wage of w. If a child  works for e units,  his total income,  Y 2, is ew. It is assumed
that, as far as the household  is concerned,  w is given  exogenously.  With  y, and  w given
exogenously, we idescribe  (xl,x2*,e  *) to be a household equilibrium if (xl*,x 2*,e  *) is the solution28
to the above collective maximization problem, with Y2  = e*w.
This equilibrium  is not necessarily unique, nor is it obvious that it always exists.  The
existence problem is best understood by converting the household's problem to a search for the
fixed point of a correspondence.
Let 4  =  [0,1] - [0,1  ] be a correspondence defined as follows.  Given any e' E  [0,1], we
can take y2 = e'w (recall w is given exogenously). Now solve the collective maximization problem
taking Y 2 to be e'w (recall y, is given exogenously). All values of e which are a part of such
solutions is the set 4(e').  This is what defines the correspondence 4,.  It is now plain that a
household equilibrium exists if and only if 4, has a fixed point.
Given that the maximand in the collective maximization  problem need not be concave, 4,
need not be convex-valued and we are not able to use Kakutani's fixed-point theorem.  Indeed it is
possible to construct reasonable examples where 4, has no fixed points.  On the other hand, it is
also possible to think of restrictions on the parameters which ensure that an equilibrium  exists.
One simple example of this is the textbook case of selfish individuals: Let us assume
u,(xl, x2, e) = f,(xl)
u2(xl, x2, e) = f2(x 2) - c(e).
That is, the parent is interested in his own consumption, the child in the child's own consumption.
It is worth emphasizing  that this is still a collective model of the household, since the household's
maximand continues to be a weighted average of the utilities of the members of the household.
Hence, the allocation of resources continue to be Pareto efficient. Let us also, as is usual, assume,
fl,  f2,  e  >  °,  fl,  f2 <  0,  and  c"  >  0.
These assumptions ensure that for every y, and y2, there is a unique (x,, x2, e) which29
solves the collective maximization  problem, and that the solution varies continuously with Y2.
Thus, ignoring other variables, we can write I(y,,  Y2) to be the value of e which solves the
maximization problem, given Yi  and Y 2. Since for every e E [0, 1], Y2  = ew, we can define
4)(e) = I(yl,  ew).  Since 4  is a continuous function from [0, 1] to [0, 1], by Brouwer's fixed point
theorem, there exists e* such that
e  = V(e+)  = i(y 1, ew)  (1)
e* is the amount of labor that the child will be made to supply in equilibrium.
Note that e* can be written as a function of y, and w, by using (1).  Thus
e' =e*(yi,w).
In other words, the child's labor supply depends on the adult wage (y,) and child wage (w) that
prevails on the market. It is possible to develop a more elaborate model with more exogenous
variables. It will be interesting to draw out the empirical implictions of such a model and put them
to test. Another direction that can be pursued is to model the interaction between household
members as a sequential game in which a player's power in period t depends on his income share
in period t-1. Instead of pursuing this here, I shall instead move on now to discuss models which
were developed eKplicitly  to explain child labor. One such model is that of Gupta (1998).
B.  Extra-household Bargaining
Citing a survey work currently afoot in some villages of West Bengal, India, Gupta (1998)
argues that a child has negligible  bargaining power in the household and is, effectively, an
instrument for the parent's maximization effort,  In addition, he assumes that parents are entirely30
selfish in the sense of being uninterested in the well-being of the children per se.  While a parent
owns his child's labor he is unable to make the child work productively for want of
complementary resources, such as land or cattle.  He found that in West Bengal villages the bulk
of child labor is directed to the maintenance of cattle.  So for work the child has to go to an
employer, who has the resources.
The bargaining that occurs in this model is between the parent and the employer over
(i) the wage, w, that is to be paid for the child's work and (ii) the fraction, A, of the wage that is to
be paid in the form of food to the child. Gupta (1998) assumes that the parents spend the cash
component of the wage entirely on themselves. I believe that this is empirically  questionable but
let us go along with it as a simplifying  assumption.
Using an efficiency  wage argument, assume that the output, x, produced by a child laborer
is a function of his consumption. So
x = x(Aw),
where x(Aw) = 0, for Aw less than some positive number, b, and concave thereafter.  That is, for
all Aw > b, x'(Aw)  > 0 and x"(Xw) < O.
Let us assume that if the bargain fails, the parent and the employer eam Yp  and YE
respectively. Hence, the threat point, of the bargaining problem is given by (Yp, YE). If the
parent and the employer agree on (w,A), their incomes are, respectively, (I -A)w and x(Xw) - w.
Therefore, the Nash bargaining problem consists of solving the following problem:
Max  [(I -X)w - Yp][x(xw)  - w  - YEI
(wTtd  )
This gives us the first-order conditions:31
[(1-X)W - )'P]X'(AW)W  - W[xN"w)  - W - YE] = 0
[(1-X)W - 'PY][X'(AW)A  - 1] + (1-A)[x(W)  - W - YE] =  0.
By rearranging these we get:
x'(Xw) =  1  (2)
and  x(Xw) + Xw  = 2w  +(YE  - YP)  (3)
Since Aw is, effectively, the child's wage, (2) says that the child's marginal product is set
equal to  1. This is the standard result of efficiency  wage.  To see this, use v to denote a child's
wage.  Then the net income generated by a child is given by x(v) - v.  If v is chosen to maximize
this, we get x'(v) ==  1, which is exactly what (2) is.  In other words, in this model a child is paid a
wage, Aw, that maximizes  net returns.  The value of this is independent of the threat point.  Once.
we know the value of Aw, we can use (3) to solve for the value of w.  This depends on Y, and YE.
As (YE - YP) increases, w falls and X increases, as is evident from (3).
It is now possible to derive comparative statics results by postulating how Y. and Yp get
set and considering variations of this.  Gupta (1998), for instance, considers the case where YE
depends on the adult wage that prevails on the market.  In particular, he assumes that Ye falls as
adult wage rises.  This implies that as adult wage rises, the child's wage, w, will rise.
One can however hypothesize other explanations for YE  and Yp and derive other theories
of how w will depend on the parameters of the model.  What is interesting about this model is
how sharply it contrasts with the model that we are about to encounter, one in which the parent is
altruistically concerned about the child's welfare. In the model just described, the child's welfare is
nobody's concern.  The child is valued in the same way as the goose that lays the golden eggs.32
6.  Multiple Equilibria and Government Intervention
What the early models seemed to overlook is that a labor market, where children are
potential workers, will be prone to having more than one equilibrium,  and if it did, then this would
raise a variety of interesting policy questions. This is demonstrated in the model of Basu and Van
(1998). It is worth asking why the model of Section 5A overlooked the possibility of multiple
equilibria. Note that the collective maximization problem reduces to the unitary model of the
household if (i) u,(x1,x2,e) =  u2(x1,x2,e), or (ii) a(y,y2) = 1, for all Y 1,Y 2, or (iii) a(YI,Y2)  = 0, for all
Y 1,Y 2. But in allowing for this generality what the model glosses over are some natural restrictions
on the utility function, which is the starting point of the model of Basu and Van (1998). The latter
is based on the unitary model. That is, it assumes that (i), (ii) or (iii) is valid, but this is not its
distinguishing mark. I would conjecture that the model's central results would remain valid even if
we allowed for bargaining within the household. A simplified  model of Basu and Van is presented
in subsection A. Subsections B-D discuss the relation between child labor and, respectively, social
norms, adult unemployment and dynamics.
A. Model with Altruism
I shall here demonstrate, following Basu and Van (1998) but using some very special
assumptions, the possibility of multiple equilibria. The special assumptions are for reasons of
convenience. The only two essential assumptions are the following:
Luxury axiom: A household would not send its children out to work if its income from
non-child labor sources were sufficiently  high.
Substitution axiom: Adult labor is a substitute for child labor, or more generally, adults33
can do what children do.
To give the simplest sketch of this model, let me strengthen these two assumptions to
assert that (1) for every household i, there exists a critical wage, Wi, such that the household will
send its children out to work if and only if the adult wage prevailing in the market is less than Wi;
and (2) adult labor and child labor are perfect substitutes subject to an adult equivalence
correction.  Both these assumptions can be relaxed enormnously  without hurting the conclusions of
the model.  Let us define W  -- Max W, and W  - min Wi.
i  i
Suppose that a child's labor is equivalent to y units of an adult's labor, where
0 < y < 1.  In other words, I am assuming that adult and child labor are perfect substitutes subject
to an adult-equivalent scale correction of y.2 2 A more convenient way of thinking of this is as
follows.  Produclion depends on the total amount of labor used; and each adult, working all day,
produces 1 unit of labor, whereas each child, working all day, produces y units of labor.
In Figure 1, let the vertical axis represent adult wage (i.e. the wage paid to an adult for a
full day's work). Consider a competitive model in which all agents are price takers.  Let AA' be
the supply curve of the aggregate adult labor in the economy. For simplicity  we show it as
perfectly inelastic. Next consider the total amount of "effective labor" that all the children can
supply. If there are X children in the economy, this will be equal to yX. Add to the aggregate
22Admittedly  this is a simplifying  assumption. What is really needed is the assumption that
adults can do w'hat  children do.  This is contrary to the pervasive, "nimble fingers" belief--that for
some activities, such as carpet-weaving, children are essential. There is however very little
empirical support for this belief (ILO, 1996). One of the most careful examination of this occurs
in the study of India's carpet industry by Deborah Levison et al (1998). By collecting information
on actual productivity--for instance, square inches knotted per hour--they reach the conclusion
that for no activity are children essential. Adults can always replace them. This is not to deny that
such substitution may cause costs to rise, since adult wages are typically higher.34
adult labor supply  the effective  labor that the children  can potentially  supply  in the economy  and
draw another line  representing  this. Let T'T be this new line. Thus AT is equal  to yX, the total
amount  of labor available  from the children  in the economy. In other words,  if the country  had  a
law that everybody  would  always  have  to supply  labor, then the aggregate  supply  curve of labor
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Now it is easy to figure out the actual, aggregate supply curve of labor. If the market
(adult) wage is bel]ow  W  then all children are sent to work; so total labor supply is OT.  If the
market wage exceeds W, no child is sent to work; so total labor supply is OA'.  As wage rises
from W to W one household after another withdraws its children from the labor force; so the
total supply of labor keeps decreasing, as shown by the curve CB. Hence the total supply of all
kincds  of labor (that is, adult plus child) plotted against alternative adult wages gives us the curve
ABCT.  Let me call this the 'hybrid supply curve'; which should serve as a reminder that it is not
quite the standard supply curve.
Not only is this supply curve backward-bending but its composition keeps changing as we
move along its contour.  Along AB it consists of pure adult labor; as we move from B to C it
includes more ancl  more child labor, and from C toT it consists of all available labor in the
economy.
The possibility  of multiple equilibria is now transparent.  I shall now assume, without loss
of generality, that whenever adult wage is W, child wage happens to be yW.  Keeping this in
mind, suppose the aggregate demand curve for labor in the economy is given by DD'.  That is,
DD' shows the total effective labor demanded by firms for every possible adult wage W.  Then
there are three equilibria 23. Let us ignore the unstable one and focus on the ones depicted by E
and F in Figure 1. If an economy is caught at point F, wages will be low (WL  for adults and -YWL
for children) and children will  be working.  The same economy, however, can be in equilibrium at
2  An important exception is a sufficiently  open, small economy, where wage would be
determined by world prices, and so the demand curve would be horizontal, thereby destroying the
multiple equilibria result (Dixit, 1998). Even in this case, however, there may be multiple
equilibria in a dynamic sense as shown in section 6D.  -36
point E, where wages are high and children do not work.
If the economy is at equilibrium point F, there is scope for an interesting policy
intervention, which in Basu and Van's paper is called a "benign intervention".  Suppose child labor
is banned.  Then effectively, the supply curve of labor becomes AA'.  So if demand conditions are
unchanged, the economy will now settle at the only equilibrium, at E.  What is interesting is that
once the equilibrium  settles at E, the law banning child labor is no longer needed (since E was
anyway an equilibrium of the original economy). It is in this sense that the intervention is
described as benign. After its initial effect, it goes dormant and can actually even be removed
without loss.  24
If the demand curve intersects the supply curve only once and on the segment CT, then a
ban on child labor may well cause a decline in welfare of the workers, including the child
laborers. 25
If this model were fitted into a Walrasian description of the entire economy, each
equilibrium  would be Pareto optimal. So between the equilibria depicted by E and F neither
Pareto dominates the other.  However, working-class households are necessarily better off at E.
To see this, consider a (call it E'), where wages are the same as at E but all children work.  Clearly
24The model also is suggestive of the link between technology and child labor. If
technology changes so that children become relatively less productive than adults (perhaps
because of the rise of the use of the computer), then we could think of y as falling. From Figure 1
it is clear that this would result in T moving left and the inferior equilibrium, where children work,
vanishing.
25Arguing  from a different perspective Jacoby and Skoufias (1997, p.33 1) reach a similar
conclusion: "... our results suggest that efforts to expand educational opportunities for the poor
[..  .] without an understanding of the economic risks and constraints they face may be met with
only limited success. Moreover, compulsory schooling laws or laws against child labor, to the
extent that they can be enforced in rural areas, could substantially  lower household welfare."37
worker households are better off at E' than at F since in both cases everybody works but in the
former the wages are higher. Next, since given the wages at E households prefer not to send the
children to work, by revealed preference we know that E is superior to E'.  Hence, by transitivity
E is preferred to F.
The contestable assumption of this model is the luxury axiom, which takes for granted
parental altruism towards the child. In the early nineteenth-century, when child labor took some of
its worst forms in industrializing  Europe, a standard critique of the British elite was that child
labor was an outcome of parental callousness (see Nardinelli, 1990, p.94). There is however
counter-evidence, including from those who themselves worked as child laborers, that the parents
sent their children out to work typically when they were compelled to do so by acute poverty
(Anderson, 1971; Vincent, 1981).
Turning to more contemporary evidence, Burra (1995) has reported evidence of parental
callousness; and Gupta (1998) has cited sources which support this viewpoint (see also Parsons
and Goldin, 1989).  The much discussed issue of discrimination against the female child in several
developing regions, notably in northern India, suggests that the answer may also differ depending
on whether we are talking of the male child or the female child. 26 In addition, a study by Alaka
Basu ( 1993) of some slums outside New Delhi brings to light another perverse causation between
adult wages and child labor. When the wage for female laborers rise, starting from a sufficiently
low level, this often prompts the mother to take up work outside home, which in turn means that
' 6The source of this discrimination  need not be household. Ifjob opportunities for females
are limited, it may be a rational response of the household to first educated the boys before
turning to the girls. In the context of adults, the more puzzling possibility of gender discrimination
in the labor market originating from within the household is modeled elegantly by Francois
(1998).38
she takes the daughter out of school in order to have her do the house work. It is arguable that if
the mother's wage rises sufficiently,  the daughter would get put back into school with household
help now being hired from outside. This suggests an inverted-U relation between adult female
wage and child labor, especially the labor of the female child.
A recent empirical test of the luxury axiom, by Ranjan Ray (1998), suggests that the
verdict is mixed. He uses data from Peru's Living Standards Measurements Survey, 1994, and
Pakistan's Integrated Household Survey, 1991, to check if the luxury axiom is valid. For this test
he constructs a dummy variable which takes a value of I for households with income below the
poverty line and 0 otherwise, and then then uses probit and logit models to test the importance of
this status on the household's decision to send its children to work. The estimated coefficients
lend support for the luxury axiom in Peru but not in Pakistan. While these tests may be interesting
in their own right, they do not really test the luxury axiom, because Ray identifies W 1 entirely with
the poverty line, whereas nowhere does the axiom suggest that this should be so. What does come
out rather interestingly from Ray's paper is, as in Basu ( 1993), the differential response of child
labor to changes in the mother's and the father's wages.
One of the best crafted empirical studies of child labor is Christiaan Grootaert's  (1998)
work on Cote d'Ivoire. It is based on annual data collected for 1600 households over the years
1985 to 1988. Sorting out carefully various definitions, he goes on to use a sequential probit
model to find the determinants of child labor. He corroborates that the characteristics of the
parents matter and also that who has these characterisitcs, the father or the mother, matters. It is
evident from his study that the very poor households often critically  rely on the children's income
and leads him to conclude that, initially, interventions should aim to make possible combining39
light work with schooling, instead of a sudden stoppage of child labor.
This is not the forum to settle this controversy but to pursue the consequences of
alternative viewpoints. The extreme case in which parents have no altruism or commitment
towards the children but treat them purely as labor-producing machines was modeled in Section
5B. My own preference is for the altruistic model of this section, while admitting that it is best
viewed as a polar characterization of reality. For a clearer conclusion we will have to wait for
further econometric work.
B.  Norms
With the idea of multiple equilibria in the core there are several directions that one can
pursue.  Albert Hirschman2'  has rightly argued that the decision to send a child to work is partly a
matter of social norm. 28 This may be made more precise by assuming that sending a child to work
makes the parents incur a social stigma cost, c; and if many children work, then c is smaller. The
latter captures the idea that while making a child work is socially frowned upon, the ferocity of
the frown is greater if you live in a society where virtually no one sends their child to work but
you do. This can yield the result that if everybody sends their child to work, it is worthwhile for
each parent to send,  his child to work and if everybody does not send their child to work, each
parent may find it not worthwhile to send his child to work (because the social stigma would be
too high). The arguLment  here is analogous to the one used by Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull
27Personal  communication to the author dated 15 February, 1995.
28"Social  norm" has many interpretations (Basu, 1998, Dasgupta, 1993). I use it here as a
social influence  that changes our preference. The relation between child labor and cultural norms
has been discussed in the book by Rodgers and Standing (1981), especially  in chapter 1.40
(1998)'  to show how the number of people who are unemployed and live off social welfare can
settle at very different values depending on which of the possible multiple equilibria is realised.
This is a simple point analytically  but is probably of considerable practical importance in
the context of child labor.  Also this is an idea that can, potentially, be developed much more and
used to address questions of policy.
C. Distribution and Unemployment
In the model of section 6A workers are assumed to be ex  ante identical and in the
equilibrium that occurs they turn out to be expost  identical. A consequence of this is that the
model is completely silent on questions of income distribution and unemployment. The literature
has relatively little to offer on these topics. The distribution question is raised in a short theoretical
paper by Swinnerton and Rogers (1998); there is little that is available on this empirically.  On the
other hand, the relation between adult unemployment and child labor has been the basis of some
empirical investigation (see Goldin, 1979; Horan and Hargis, 1991; Bonnet, 1993;
Chandrasekhar, 1997); the hiatus here is in the theory. Modeling the relation theoretically is a
large and interesting topic but some initial steps towards it are easy to take using the model of
section A above. 30 Before doing so, I want to briefly recount Swinnerton and Rogers' argument.
Their paper begins with the observation that if a parent's decision to send the children to
work depends on (among other things) the parent's income, then we should look at not just the
29For  the use of similar assumptions, see Granovetter (1978), and  Besley and Coate
(1992).
30A different model linking adult unemployment with child labor occurs in Gupta (1997).41
parent's wage but also any profits that may accrue to the parents. So they move away from the
polar assumption of Basu and Van's model by supposing that the firms are owned by  a fraction A
of the workers. So fDr  workers in this category income equals wages plus a share of profits, while
the remaining workers earn only wages. They then show that, if in an economy there exists a good
equilibrium,  then there does not exist an equilibrium  in which the dividend-earning workers send
their children to work. This directs the policy discussion to matters of distribution. Giving
workers a share in profits turn out to be a method of curbing child labor. This is a valid argument,
though the feasibility  of such policy changes may be restricted for reasons of politics.
Turning to the subject of adult unemployment, let us suppose that there are N worker
households and each household has one adult and m children. As before, child non-work is a
luxury good and, in particular, for each household i there is a critical adult wage W; such that if
the adult wage rises above W 1, the household withdraws its children from working. Adults, on the
other hand, always prefer to work, no matter what the wage. This immediately  gives us the
aggregate labor supply curve as in figure 1.
As before, let us assume that one child manages to produce the equivalent of y units of
adult labor. Hence if the prevailing  market child wage, W,,  happens to be equal to yW, where W
is the prevailing market adult wage, then firms will be indifferent between employing adults and
children. Let us focus on the case where yW = W,  I should clarify that I am not assuming W, to
be exogenously fixed. Rather I am trying to isolate an equilibrium in which W, happens to be
equal to yW.
Within the confines of this case we can think of the total effective demand for labor to be a
function of W. Let us denote such an aggregate demand function by d(W). Let us assume that this42
is downward-sloping and take DD' in figure 1 as representing such a demand curve.
To study the impact of adult unemployment on child labor, we first need a model in which
there can exist adult unemployment. The best way to develop such a model is to use some model
which can endogenously explain wage rigidities. I shall, however, for reasons of simplicity,  stay
away from such complications 3' and simply  assume that adult wage is exogenously fixed at W*,
where W* is such that d(W*) < N. In other words, we are focusing on cases above point E in
figure 1. The questions are: How many adults will find employment? Will children be working and
if so what will be the incidence of child labor?
In answering these questions I shall consider the case where ym < I and d(W*) - ymN >
0. This is merely a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium in which yW* = W.  A
fuller model will have to go beyond this and consider other cases as well, but the logic of the
relation between child labor and adult unemployment comes out clearly even in this limited model.
Let us use E to denote the number of adults that will find employment. Since the total
demand for labor is d(W*), it follows that d(W*) - E will be the amount of labor demanded from
children. In other words, the number of children demanded by the firms will be [d(W*) - E]/y.
Since child wages are not rigid, demand for child labor must be equal to supply of child labor. So
what remains to be done is to determine the supply of child labor. Note that if only E adults find
employment, N - E households will be earning zero income from the adults. So these will be the
households that will send the children out to work. Hence, if E adults find work, the supply of
child labor will be given by m(N - E).  In other words, E is equilibrium adult employment if
m(N - E) = [d(W*) - EJ/y
3 "For  a model of child labor and efficiency wage see Genicot (1998).43
To remind ourselves that the value of E depends on W*, let us write the solution of this equation
as E(W*). Evidently,
E(W*) = [d(W*) - ymN]/ (1- ym)
Since d(.) is a downward sloping function, it follows that as W* rises, adult employment, E(W*),
will fall.
If we use C(W*) to denote the number of children who find employment, when adult
wage is fixed at W*',  then we have:
C(W*)  =  m[N - E(W*)]  =  m[N - d(W*)]/(l  - ym).
Given that we are considering the case where ym < 1, it follows that C(W*) >  0. Further, as W*
rises, C(W*) rises. Since a rise in W* increases adult unemployment, a rise in adult unemployment
is associated with an increased incidence of child labor.
This confirmns  intuition and empirical findings but also cautions us about the right policy
intervention 32. If market wages rise, we have good reason to believe that child labor will decline,
but that does not mean that this impact on child labor can always be replicated by raising adult
wages by fiat. If the adult labor market has oligopsonistic elements, a rise in the legal minimum
wage can boost adult employment and cause a decline in child labor, but in competitive labor
markets one will have to rely on interventions which boost adult wage by shifting the equilibrium.
D. Dynamics
One big caveat in the large literature on child labor is the treatment of dynamics. Yet the
32The  model also allows us to derive some theoretically puzzling results, such as how the
abolition of a legal minimum  wage can cause wages to rise. To see this start from a minimum
wage, W*, below point E in Figure I and derive the equilibrium as done above.44
dynamic consequences of child labor are likely to be large since an increase in child labor
frequently causes a decline in the acquisition of  human capital. If a child is employed all through
the day, it is likely that the child will remain uneducated and have low productivity as an adult.
While the analysis  of the long-run consequences of child labor is almost totally ignored in
the literature (Baland and Robinson, 1998, being an exception), one can draw on some papers on
human capital acquisition and its long-run consequences, a la Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee
and Newman (1993) and Ljungqvist (1993) to derive some hints for modeling the dynamics  of
child labor 33. This is what I attempt here and in the process develop the idea of a "child labor
trap".  I use some strong assumptions to develop my argument but it should be possible to relax
these.
Since my aim is to explain multiple equilibria in the long-run, it cannot be criticized if I
make an assumption which tilts the description of the single-period model away from multiple
equilibria. Note that in Figure 1, if the demand curve is sufficiently  elastic, there will exist only
one equilibrium in the single-period model.  To ensure that this is the case, I shall assume that the
demand for labor is perfectly elastic.
Consider an overlapping generations model in which each person lives for two periods,
first as a child and then as an adult; and at the start of the second period gives birth to a child. As
a child a person can either work or go to school (that is, acquire human capital).  So if we denote
a full day by 1 and a child works for a fraction e of the day, then the amount of human capital
acquired by the child is 1 - e - h.
3 For an overlapping generations model of parental schooling decisions, with implications
for child labor, see Glomm (1997).45
The productivity of an adult depends on the amount of human capital, h, he acquired as a
child. If we think cf L as the number of labor units produced by one adult, then what we are
assuming is that
Lt =L(N-,),  L'> 0,L" <  0.34  (4)
Let us make the normalization assumption that L(0) = 1. In other words, the amount of labor
produced by an unskilled adult is defined to be 1. That there is an inverse relation between child
labor and the child's productivity in later life is also assumed by Parsons and Goldin (1989),
though they do not pursue the long-run consequence of this assumption.
Let us use V to denote the wage of one unit of labor.  If labor demand is perfectly elastic,
this will be constanit and so we take the wage rate to be fixed at V.  Hence, in period t, an adult
who as a child, that is,  in period t - 1, had worked e,_ 1 amount, will have an income of
VL(I  -et.  ,)  =  Wt.  (5)
As is the model of subsection A, we assume that it is the parent who decides whether to
send a child to work.  Let us assume that there is a wage W such that,  if adult income is below
3 4So  we are assuming that if a child works more, his productivity as an adult falls. We
justify this by assuming that a child's nonworking time is spent on studying. Even without this
assumption one can argue that child labor diminishes  adult productivity. As Pigou (1920, p. 751)
had noted, "Many fDrms  of unskilled labor at present open to boys not merely fail to train, but
positively untrain, their victims". Swaminathan's (1997) study of child labor in Gujarat, India,
weakly confirms this. She found that for boys entering the labor force as a child lowered
productivity when they became adults, though for girls there was no significant  effect one way or
the other.  It is however noteworthy that in some special cases this relation tends to go the other
way. The English cotton mills of the last century may be a case in point. Galbi (1997) has argued
that the share of child labor in the mills fell during the early nineteenth century precisely because
the earlier rise in child labor meant that, as these children grew up, there would be a cohort of
more productive adult workers.46
W  the parent sends the child to work full time, that is e = 1. Let us also assume that there is a
wage W >  W such that, if adult income exceeds W, he does not send his child to work at all, that
is, e = 0.  Unlike in the model of subsection A, we take all adults to be identical and assume that
the child's labor is not a 0-1 decision but monotonically varies with the parent's income.  This may
be summed up by assuming that the amount of work that a child is made to do in period t is a
function of the parent's wage in period t:
et = e(W,),  (6)
such that e(W) = 1, for all W s W; e(W) =  0, for all W 2  W  and e'(W) < 0, for all We(_,  W).
From (5) and (6) we get
e, -e(VL(l-e,,  l))  (7)
which may be described in brief as
e, -- (et 1).  (8)
From the assumptions made above we know that 4  is upward sloping and bounded above
at e(VL(O)) = e(V).  In order to focus on the interesting case we consider an 4i which intersects
the 450 line more than once. In the case illustrated in Figure 2, there are three steady-state
equilibria, of which two are stable. These are depicted by points 0 and E.  At E, a poor parent
makes the child work full-time. The child acquires no skills and so as an adult earns very little and
has to send his child, in turn, to work full-time. This equilibrium  depicts what may be called a47
"child  labor  trap". 3'  On the other hand 0 depicts  an equilibrium  where a child  goes to school,
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35A  differerit  kind of trap has been modeled  by Eswaran  (1996).  In his framework  the
existence  of the institution  of child  labor  biases  parents  towards having  more  uneducated  children
rather than a few educated  children.  And  this choice  in turn perpetuates  the institution  of child
labor.
36It is possible  to argue that in addition  to the fact that an educated  parent  is able  to
educate  her child,  tlhe  very fact of growing  up in a household  in which  the adults  are educated
confers  knowledge  on and  therefore  increased  productivity  to a child.  This could render  the better
equilibrium  even  mnore  dynamic  than suggested  by this model.  For a discussion  of the externalities
of literacy  within  a household,  see Basu and Foster (1998).48
There is scope for fruitful intervention by government.  If an economy is caught in a child
labor trap, what is needed is a large effort to educate one generation and this can get the economy
rolling towards the virtuous equilibrium  without need for further action. Chaudhri (1997) has
discussed several versions of "virtuous spirals" and discusses instances of how child labor tends to
decline rapidly once a "tipping point" is reached.
As is shown by Parsons and Goldin (1989), the sub-optimality of investment in education
is closely-related to the availability  of efficient capital markets (see, also, Jacoby and Skoufias,
1997). There is also evidence from the field that the availability  of credit on decent terms can
rescue many from the perils of child labor, since in developing countries, such as India, a typical
reason for a child to drop out of school is not chronic poverty but a temporary mishap for the
household, such as the father losing a job or a sibling  needing medical support.
The credit question comes up starkly in the model of Baland and Robinson ( 1998). Theirs
is a two-period model of child labor in which inefficiency  occurs despite parental altruism,
because parents may run out of resources needed to educate the child. The only option then is to
borrow against the child's future income, and this is typically not possible. This shows that to
solve the problem of child labor one has to go beyond providing perfect capital markets. What is
needed is the enforcement of inter-generational contracts, whereby what i borrows for i's child's
education is paid back by the child when she grows up and by when i may be dead. But it is not
clear that creating institutions for enforcing such contracts is desirable, since it will be open to the
moral hazard of  'inverse bequests', whereby a person borrows funds in the name of the child's
education and leaves the child with a repayment burden.
Another related feature, that I do not model here but is important, is the fertility decision.49
We have in this paper treated the number of children as exogenously given. In reality, the number
of children a family has is partly volitional and the decision may well depend on whether children
can find work (Cain, 1977; Rosenzweig and Evenson, 1977; Eswaran, 1996; Bardhan and Udry,
1998). Cain's study of Bangladesh shows that not only do children contribute to household
incomes but a boy becomes a net producer by the age of 12 years and after the age of 15 years his
cumulative contribution exceeds their cumulative consumption. Plainly, these are features that a
proper dynamic model should be able to incorporate.  There is need for such a model and the
above outline should be viewed as motivation towards it.
7.  Sexual Harassment and Child Labor
Corporal punishment and sexual exploitation have, at several stages of history, been
closely associated with child labor.  Commenting on Britain during the industrial revolution,
Nardinelli (1982, p. 294) has observed how the use of violence was common against child
laborers, though "by the middle of the 19th  century it was seldom used for older workers".3  In a
model on the use of violence with special reference to child labor, Chwe (1990) has tried to
explain this asymmetric treatment of adults and children in terms of the lower reservation utility of
the latter. Evidence of violence also cropped up repeatedly during the interviews conducted by the
British Parliamentary committee investigating child labor in 1832. For instance, a cotton spinner,
Thomas Daniel admitted that the child laborers "are always in terror; and ... the reason of their
being in a state of terror and fear is, that we are obliged to have our work done, and we are
"Nardinel]li  argued that the use of violence was a mechanism  for raising productivity, a
claim that has not gone unchallenged (see Mackinnon and Johnson, 1984, and Nardinelli, 1984).
For some contemporary accounts of coerced child labor see Jonathan Silvers, 1996.50
compelled to use the strap...." (British Parliamentary Papers, 1968, p. 325).
In what follows I want to raise a different theoretical question concerning violence and
sexual harassment. Consider first the case of adult labor. Is there a case for banning violence
against and sexual harassment when these occur as a consequence of voluntary contracting?  I will
argue that the answer is a conditional yes; and then try to show that the claim may be carried over
to the context of child labor to construct a novel argument for banning child labor in certain
situations. Though the theoretical claim applies to all kinds of violence, I illustrate it here with
respect to sexual harassment. This argument goes to the core of the philosophical debate
concerning the state's right to ban voluntary transactions between consenting individuals, such as
the signing of self-enslavement contracts or trade in human organs or a child's decision to sell his
labor. The best of the existing arguments are quite tenuous 38 and so this is a matter that deserves
closer scrutiny.
Economists usually take the line that a voluntary contract between two agents that does
not have negative externalities on uninvolved outsiders ought not to be banned. Let me call this
the "principle of free contract". If we accept this principle, then it is not clear why sexual
harassment in the work place should always be banned.  Consider one kind of harassment which is
ex  antte  voluntary.  Suppose an entrepreneur advertises for workers, openly saying that he will pay
a wage above the market rate but he reserves the right to sexually harass his employees.
Therefore, if a worker joins this firm, it must be that she finds that the benefit outweighs the cost.
If we accept the principle of free contract, it now seems difficult  to justify banning open sexual
38 For useful discussions of this debate see Ellerman (1992, Chapter 9) and Trebilcock
(1993, Chapter, 4). For an outline of the debate on what constitutes sexual harassment, see
Hadfield (1995).51
harassment of the kind just described. But I believe there is an argument that can be constructed
which respects the principle of free contract, and yet may justify a ban.
Note that under normal assumptions the following is true:  If harassment is allowed, then
those workers who are especially strongly averse to harassment will be worse off because the
market wage that they will be able to command will be lower than what it would be if no
harassment were allowed by law. I call this the "harassment lemma"; and begin by proving it.
Suppose that we have a market with two kinds of workers, with type-  I workers having a
stronger aversion to sexual harassment than type-2 workers.  For reasons of algebraic ease let us
assume that type  I's distaste for harassment is infinite (so they would rather be unemployed than
face harassment), while type 2's distaste is zero.  If the wage rate is W and there is no harassment,
the aggregate supply of labor by type-i workers is f,(W). As usual, fi'(W) > 0.
This is a competitive model; so workers and employers are wage-takers.  Let me, for
simplicity, assume that there is only one employer and he gets a satisfaction of 0 (> 0) from
harassing each worker.  The production function of the employer is given by x = x(n), where x' >
0, x" < 0,  n is the number of workers and x the total output.
Let W. be the wage for those who sign the with-harassment contract and WN  for those
who sign the no-harassment contract.  If the employer hires nH  workers under the H-contract and
nN  workers under the N-contract, his total profit is  x(nH+nN)  - nHWH  - nNWN  - OnH.  The first-
order conditions from maximizing  this can be rearranged and written as follows:
x'(nH + nN)  =  WN  (9)
WH  =  WN  +0  (10)
Clearly, type-I workers will sign N-contracts and type-2 workers will sign H-contracts. Hence,52
the total supply of workers for N-contracts will be f,(WN)  and the total supply for H-contracts will
be f2(WH).  Therefore, using (9) and (10), we can say that  W,N  is an equilibrium  if
X'(f1(W  +  f2(W  +  0))  W.
Consider now a legal regime where harassment is never allowed. Hence, there is only one
wage in the market, W.  The employer maximizes  x(n) - nW. The total supply of labor is given by
fi(W) + f2(W). W  is an equilibrium wage if x'(f,(W*) + f2(W*))  = W*.
Since f2 > 0 and x" < 0, it follows that W'  < W'.  This completes the proof.
What the harassment lemma establishes is this. If we adhere to the principle of free
contract, then even though we may have no reason for stopping finite pairs of individuals (an
employer and an empoyee) from getting into harassment contracts, there may be good reason for
adopting the riule  that no harassment contracts should be allowed in the workplace. This is made
possible by the fact that, in competition, the aggregate is not simply  the sum of all atomistic acts.
Note that the harassment lemma does not provide sufficient reason for banning
harassment, but simply  shows that allowing contractual harassment cannot be justified on grounds
of the principle of free contract, since allowing harassment typically has a negative externality on
uninvolved indivduals. Clearly, a negative externality cannot be a sufficient reason for disallowing
any action. Otherwise we would have to say that no one should be allowed to work on days when
there is a cricket match because otherwise those who like watching cricket will be adversely
affected.
To establish a sufficiency  criterion, we need go beyond economics and identify human
preferences which are 'fundamental' in the sense that no one should have to pay a price for having53
such a preference. This may be a controversial list but very few people will deny that there are
such 'fundamental preferences', and also that not all preferences qualify as fundarnental. In most
societies the preference not to be sexually harassed would be considered fundamental. No one
should have to pay a penalty for having such a preference. On the other hand the preference for
missing work when a cricket match is on would not be considered fundamental by most of us.
You may of course have such a preference but you should be prepared to pay some price for it.
It is the harassment lemma coupled with the recognition that the preference not to be
sexually harassed is fundamental that clinches the case for an outright ban on sexual harassment.
It is easy to see that the harassment lemma, as an abstract idea, carries over from the
domain of sexual harassment to child labor, by assuming that households have different degrees of
aversion to sending their children to work.  For concreteness turn to the model of Section 6A and
assume that there are two types of households, 1 and 2, where a type-i household is one which
would send its children out to work if and only if adult wage drops to below wi. Let us assume
that w, = - - (thai is, type 1 households never send their children to work), whereas w2 =  (that
is, type 2 households always send their children to work).
By using a,  diagrammatic technique similar  to the one used in Figure 1 it is immediately
obvious that the market wage rises if a ban on child labor is imposed. Conversely, if a ban on
child labor is removed, wages must fall; and so type-I households become worse off  This
establishes the counterpart of the harassment lemma.
Therefore,,  not having a ban on child labor penalizes households that have a stronger
preference not to send their children to work.  Following the claims of the above subsection, this
leads to a case for a ban on child labor if we consider a household's preference not to send its54
children to work to be a fundamental preference.  To my mind this is not unambiguously
fundamental or non-fundamental. It is plainly more fundamental than a person's preference for
missing work during cricket matches and probably less so than a preference for not submitting to
harassment. So, while the case is not automatic, this is a possible avenue for justifying legal action
against child labor.
8.  International Labor Standards
A topic closely related to the subject of child labor is that of  'international labor standards'
and the use of'social  clauses' as a prerequisite for trade.  For many years, overtly or covertly,
people have argued the need to enforce some minimal  standards of labor, concerning working
conditions, duration of work, the level of wages and so on. 39
Laborers have often had to work in apalling conditions for meagre wages.  So a part of the
agitation for minimal  international labor standards is indeed inspired by a genuine concern for the
well-being of workers.  But as is only to be expected in such situations, forces of protection and
lobbies with their own interest in mind have taken up positions behind this banner.  The presence
of international organizations make it now possible, what earlier would be infeasible,  to bring
multi-national pressure to individual  nations to comply with some minimal  labor standards.  In
forums, such as the ILO, GATT and now WTO, the subject of labor standards or social clauses
has been a live one (Bhagwati, 1995).  Some industrialized nations have campaigned for the
inclusion of social clauses in the WTO which would either deny nations that do not fulfil minimal
39See Chamovitz (1987) and Srinivasan (1996) for discussion of the roots of the labor-
standards movement. For a discussion of alternative interpretations of "labor standards" see
Sengenberger and Campbell  (1994).55
labor standards the membership of WTO or enable other nations to place a trade embargo on any
nation that violates the standards.
One major area for setting international labor standards concerns child labor (see Fields,
1995; Bloom and Nloor 1996; Maskus and Holman, 1996 and Golub, 1997, Brown, 1998). As an
ultimate objective everybody agrees that children should not work, just as adults should not
overwork and get underpaid.  Given these objectives, what is the right policy response?  Here
answers have differed widely. One answer is that since one country's acquiescence to lower labor
standards gives it trading advantages in labor-intensive goods, there should be multilateral
sanctions against such a country; and social clauses should be used to deter such "illegitimate
advantages" (see, for instance, Collingsworth, Goold and Harvey, 1994; and Wilkinson, 1994).
At the other end of the spectrum is the argument that countries trade on the basis of their
relative advantages and for some countries the advantage lies in their cheap labor.  To try to level
these out through the use of multilateral threats is to practice protectionism, which is likely to hurt
not just workers in the Third World but consumers in the developed nations as well. In particular,
several economists have argued that a social clause in the WTO is not the right response to child
labor and other problems of labor standards (Bhagwati, 1995; Srinivasan, 1996). Instead,
Bhagwati (1995, p. 757) argues for "methods of suasion" and for ILO to be the main international
agency to strive towards better standards.
A variety of positions have also been taken between the two described above. Rodrik
(1996), for instance.,  argues that, while one has to be aware that the "upward harmonization"of
labor standards can rob poor nations of their comparative advantage in labor-intensive goods, it
may be all right to use trade restrictions against nations that violate a widely held moral code in56
the importing  country  so as to safeguard  domestic  labor  standards.  He calls  this a "social
safeguard  clause",  and suggests  (1) institutional  mechanisms  for ensuring  that these are not
misused  by one nation  against  another  and (2) a scheme  for providing  compensation  (under
certain  circumstances)  to a developing  country  that loses out as a consequence  of such
sanctions. 40
To check on the impact  of imposing  international  labor standards  on developing  nations
(and to deduce  which  ones  are worthwhile)  it is important  to have  a suitable  theoretical  model.
My interest  here is in child labor standards. The theoretical  modeling  of labor  standards  is still  in
its nascency  (see Bloom  and Noor, 1996;  Maskus  and Holman,  1996;  Srinivasan,  1996). Of
these, Maskus  and Holman  are most directly  concerned  with child  labor standards. Their  model  is
based  on introducing  the "demand  for child  labor standards"  as an argument  in the representative
agent's  Cobb-Douglas  utility  function. This makes  some  of the conclusions,  such  as the need  for
child  labor  standards,  too direct a consequence  of the assumptions  of the model;  and it also leaves
no margin  for the fact the people's attitude  to child  labor may  embody  a misunderstanding  of the
implications  of child  labor for child  welfare.
It seems  to me more  valuable  to analyse  policy  starting  from a standard  utility  function,
instead  of one chosen  specially  for the occasion.  In what follows  we derive  lessons  for labor
standards  from a model  which  (i) does not introduce  'labor  standards'  as a direct  argument  in the
utility  function  and (ii) recognizes  the inter-dependence  of decisions  between  nations.
Consider  the model  of Section  6A. Let us simplify  it a little  by supposing  that all
40The  idea  of compensating  developing  nations  for adopting  higher  labor standards  was
originally  contained  in Ehrenberg  (1994). See Krueger  (1997)  for discussion.57
households are identical and at adult-wage W they draw their children out of the labor force.  Let
us also assume y = 1. On the other hand, we complicate the model a little by assuming that while
the aggregate demand for labor is given by AD in Figure 3 and aggregate supply by BCFG (its
strange shape is natural and was explained in Section 6A), these demand and supply are evenly
distributed over t regions, RI,  ... , Rt, of the economy.  In other words if there are an aggregate of
N consumers and n firms each region has N/t consumers and n/t firms.
In other words, the demand curve AD is a horizontal summation of the demand of n
identical firms and also the horizontal summation of the demand curves in the t regions..
While we can think of RI,  ..., R, as different regions of a country, we can also think of
these as t countries belonging toa global economy. We could think of these together as belonging
to a 'region'  of the world. I shall assume that the world price of the good produced by this region
is one and, thanks to free trade, nothing that happens in the region can change this price. Labor,
on the other hand, is region specific. Workers cannot migrate from one country to another.
What we shall do is to study the impact of child labor laws on welfare with and without
capital mobility. In this model I interpret capital mobility  entirely in terms of the mobility of firms.
In other words we shiall  consider two alternative scenarios: one where firms can freely move
between the t countries (or regions); and another in which the firms are entirely country specific.
Suppose the economy is at the bad equilibrium, EB. Wage is WL;  the total employment is
OG.  The left-hand panel of Figure 3 depicts what happens in each region. In each region
employment is equal to O'G' = (OG)/t. The figure is drawn as if t = 2.
Consider first the case where firms are region specific. If a ban is imposed on child labor
in only one country (the one shown in the left-panel of Figure 3), then, for reasons given in58
Section 5A, equilibrium  will drift from EB  to EG  (in the left-panel of Figure 3).  In the case
illustrated in Figure 3, workers in this region will be better off by the ban.
Figure 3
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Now suppose firms are fully mobile. Once again consider a ban on child labor imposed
only in one country (the one depicted in the left-panel of Figure 3).  This will imply that the total
labor supply in these t countries will be BCHJ, where HF = CF/t, since child labor from one
country is no longer available. 4'  Hence equilibrium wage rises to W
4 "Note  also that JG must be equal to l'G'.59
Let us see what the equilibrium  looks like for each individual nation.  Clearly, the nation
which imposes the ban will be at a point like K, where wage is W* and total employment is O'J'
(i.e. only adults are employed). All other nations are at a point such as M.  This is caused by the
flight of capital (in this case, firms) from the nation imposing the ban.
In this new equilibrium, the country imposing the ban will have to incur large costs
monitoring the ban because it is not in the self-interest of workers and employers to comply with
the ban.  In addition the workers of this nation are likely to be worse off with the ban.  This will
be especially true if t is large (which will imply that W*  will be close to WL)
Now suppose that through an international labor standards agreement all nations agree to
impose a ban on child labor. There is now no flight of capital since one nation is as good as
another.  So the aggregate equilibrium  shifts to EG  and each nation shifts from EB to  EG.  All
workers are better off and the ban does not need to be monitored since in this new equilibrium
wage is so high (at WH)  that parents do not want to send their children to work.
It is true that we get this extreme result by focusing on the case where the aggregate
demand curve AD intersects the aggregate supply curve more than once. Nevertheless, what it
illustrates is an important implication of the model of Section 6A for international labor standards.
There are contexts where, even though labor standards are undesirable for each nation
behaving atomistically, they are worthwhile if the standards are co-ordinated across a large
number of nations and indeed once this is achieved it may be in the self-interest of everybody to
live by the standards.
One must add some notes of caution to the above proposition. First, the proposition must
not be taken to detract from the claim that labor standards are often a front for protectionism.60
The proposition claims that it is possible for co-ordinated effort to benefit all.  It does not say that
this will always be the case. What the proposition highlights is the fact that coordinated effort is
better than individual  effort. Second, it is conceivable that once we allow for the heterogeneity of
nations, the case will be (when there is a case at all) for labor standards which vary across nations.
Third, if we worked with a demand curve which was sufficiently  low so that it intersects the
aggregate supply curve of labor once and on the segment FG, we would find that even a co-
ordinated labor standards imposed on all nations will need monitoring (compliance being not in
the self-interest of all individuals), though it will continue to be the case that it is better to have a
coordinated effort rather than one imposed idiosyncratically  on some nations.
9.  Conclusion
The literature on child labor is an illustration of abundance and anarchy. Theoretical
writings on the subject are relatively few though one finds theoretical insights in many unexpected
papers and books which may be otherwise purely empirical or descriptive. The empirical writings
on child labor are numerous but they are usually not founded on any theory. By bringing together
the main theoretical ideas, this survey hopes to encourage not just further theoretical research but
empirical work which is analytically  better founded.
Also evident from this survey is the fact that there is no unique prescription.  Should child
labor be banned outright?  Should the WTO be given the responsibility of enforcing restrictions
on child labor through the use of trade sanctions? Should there be a legal minimum  wage for
adults so as to make it unnecessary for parents to send their children to work?  The answer
depends on the context.61
It was argued in this paper that there is much that can and ought to be done, but the
precise policy to be followed depends on the economic milieu for which the prescription is being
sought. The main policy divide is between legal interventions and what may be called
collaborative interventions, that is, public action which alters the economic environment such that
parents of their owII  accord prefer to withdraw the children from the labor force. The availability
of good schools, the provision of free meals, effort to bolster adult wages, are examples of
collaborative interventions. We have discussed examples and given arguments to show that such
interventions are, in general, a desirable way of curbing child labor. However, many of these
actions may not be feasible. There may not be money enough in the government's coffers to run
better schools or to improve the infrastructure which would result in higher adult wages.
In such circumstances, should government resort to legal action to restrict child labor?
There seems to be some agreement, that some minimal  restrictions, such as children being
prevented from working in hazardous occupations or under bonded labor conditions, are worth
enforcing legally. It is true that one can always think of some circumstance where even such a
minimal law will work to the detriment of the child. But, by and large, children being made to
work in hazardous conditions is either an act of child abuse or ignorance on the part of the parents
and the child and so, in general, it is better to declare such action as illegal.
But what about a more general ban on child labor per se?  The evidence and the theory
that we studied in this paper suggest that there is no unconditional answer to this. There are
circumstances where, even if such a total ban were feasible and costless to implement, it ought not
to be implemented. To understand this one must realize that there are worse things that can
happen to children than having to work. In very poor regions, the alternative to work may be to62
suffer acute hunger or starvation.  Indeed, when child labor occurs as a mass phenomenon, it is
likely that the alternative to work is very harsh; because even poor parents do not in general like
to send their children to work if they can help it.
Curiously enough, despite this, there are circumstances where a total ban may be desirable
from the point of view of the well-being of the children. This is because, whereas a single parent
withdrawing the child from work cannot influence equilibrium  wages, a large scale withdrawal of
child labor can cause adult wages to rise so much that the working class household is better off  It
was argued in this paper that this is unlikely to be true for very poor economies but may be valid
for relatively better off countries. Even so, one would need to do detailed empirical work to
decide whether such a total ban is worthwhile. The interesting insight that theory gives us here is
to tell us that it may be so and to give some hints about the type of economy where this is likely.
Another thing that we know is that, if a ban is deemed desirable, a good way to implement
it is by making schooling compulsory. This is because a child's presence in school is easier to
monitor than a child's abstention from work. It is true that schooling is compatible with a certain
amount of work, since children can work before and after school; but it is a good way to prevent
fiJll-time work and of course is desirable in itself  It has, in fact, been argued by some that, in
very poor countries, we should make it possible for children to combine school with work, instead
of thinking of these as mutually exclusive activities.
The case for a ban on child labor in the export goods sector alone, which would be a
natural concomitant.  of effort in industrialized nations to boycott the import of goods made with
child labor, is weaker, since this could result in children being diverted to less desirable or more
hazardous work. In general, it is better to take econhomy-wide  measures against child labor and, if63
there is to be a sector-specific ban, this should be based on the working conditions of that sector,
rather than the destination of the goods.
This reservation carries over to certain kinds of international action, such as the imposition
of minimal labor standards as a prerequisite for trade, since this results in the maintenance of
standards only in thie  exports sector. In addition, international labor standards can cause trade
distortions by failing to recognize the comparative advantages of different nations. The paper used
some of the models of child labor to investigate the impact of international standards. It was
found that one beneficial affect of such standards could be the help that they can provide to
developing nations to make a coordinated improvement in their working conditions, without
causing a flight of capital.  The idea of international labor standards as an instrument of collusion
among developing countries suggests news ways to think about this problem. The discussion here
was brief and preliminary  and simply  points to directions for future research.64
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